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Many automation and power control systems are integrated into the ‘Smart Grid’ concept 
for efficiently managing and delivering electric power. This integrated approach created 
several challenges that need to be taken into consideration such as cyber security issues, 
information sharing, and regulatory compliance. There are several issues that need to be 
addressed in the area of cyber security. Currently, there are no metrics for evaluating 
cyber security and methodologies to detect cyber attacks are in their infancy. There is a 
perceived lack of security built into the smart grid systems, but there is no mechanism for 
information sharing on cyber security incidents. In this thesis, we discuss the 
vulnerabilities in power system devices, and present ideas and a proposal towards 
multiple-threat system intrusion detection. We propose to test the multiple-threat methods 
for cyber security monitoring on a multi-laboratory test bed, and aid the development of a 











 Cyber Infrastructure refers to information and communications systems and 
services, which are composed of all hardware and software, that process, store, and 
communicate information, or any combination of all of these elements. The development 
of Smart Grids replacing the conventional power grids is envisioned as being great step 
for energy independence, global warming and emergency requirements. They use an 
intelligent two-way digital communication for monitoring and controlling the devices.  
 
The Smart Grid plays an important role in responding to many conditions in supply and 
smart energy demand and can save over billions of dollars over the next 20 years, and 
this might be crucial to the economy of a country. The U.S. Government proposed that all 
critical infrastructure companies need to meet new cyber security standards and grant the 
president emergency powers over control of the grid systems and other infrastructure.    
 
SCADA systems lie at the heart of power utility control networks. The devices allow 
utilities such as power plants, to remotely control and monitor power generation devices 
and substations over phone lines, radio links and, IP networks.  
 
There have been IT-infrastructure failures in the past. All the failures were not due to any 
terrorist or Internet hacker attack; the failures were also because of unexpected mistakes, 
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poor design, and lack of a proper alert mechanism. Therefore, inadvertent compromises 
must also be addressed, and the focus must be an all-hazards approach.  Figure 1 shows a 
general characterization of failure in an IT infrastructure based on source of failure.                    
  
 
   Figure 1: Pie Chart illustrating the percentage of incidents [6] 
 
 
In an effort to obtain an accurate breakdown of the perpetrators background, the incidents 
were categorized as coming from malware authors, current employees, hackers, software 
vendors, former employees, current contractors, agents of foreign nations, competitors, 






Figure 2: Bar chart illustrating the percentage of attacks based on the perpetrators [6]. 
 
 
In March 2000, an unauthorized access into the control system of a wastewater plant in 
Maroochy Shire, Queensland, Australia, had been the cause for the release of 1 million 
liters of sewage into the surrounding waterways. [27] 
 
In January 2003, the “Slammer” worm entered Davis-Besse nuclear power plant network 
in Ohio by infecting the computer connected to it and disabled the computerized safety 
monitoring system by bypassing the firewall. [26] 
 
In August 2003, the communication system of the U.S. railway company CSX 
Transportation was infected by a worm and the dispatching and signaling systems were 
affected. This caused traffic in Washington, D.C. and all passengers and freight traffic 




Another incident that had impacted this research would be the blackout in April 2009, 
where Chinese PLA hackers are blamed to have accidentally triggered the power shortage 
in Florida [1].  
 
In July 2010, the Windows computer worm, Stuxnet, was propagated in the industrial 
software and equipment. The worm was targeted only to Siemens SCADA with a highly 
specific payload to reprogram the operation of attached uranium refining centrifuges in 
Iranian facilities.  
1.2 Problem Statement 
The need to address potential vulnerabilities has been acknowledged across the  
United States federal government, including the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of 
Energy (DOE), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). NISTIR 7628 also provides 
guidelines for smart grid cyber security and it is highly essential that all the security 
practices be in compliance with the standards. Cyber security requirements are implicitly 
recognized as critical in all of the priority action plans discussed in the Special 
Publication (SP), NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability 
Standards, Release 1.0 (NIST SP 1108), which was published in January 2010. 
 
The Framework document describes a high-level reference model for the Smart Grid, 
identifies 75 existing standards that can be used now to support Smart Grid development, 
identifies 15 high-priority gaps and harmonization issues (in addition to cyber security). 
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Attackers will come up with new ways to compromise the computer controlling the 
control system, and it is necessary to devise new security standards to be followed by all 
organizations in order to secure the power-system environment from various attacks. All 
organizations should follow the Cyber Security Standards for communication and data 
acquisition. 
1.3 Objective of the research 
The research is partitioned into 5 tasks. First, a vulnerability assessment is done in 
order categorize the devices in terms of high risk and general vulnerabilities. Second, the 
vulnerability assessment is extended to attacks from an insider, attack on the computer 
monitoring and controlling the devices, attack on the SCADA network, and programming 
of malware into the control system devices.  Third, a network monitoring solution is 
given, that can monitor the connections and payloads in a SCADA network and report 
any external or malicious connections. Fourth, The network monitoring solution is made 
to work along with State Estimation to provide a complete monitoring solution to report 
on malicious connections. Fifth, a proposal for SCADA test bed is presented.  
1.4 Thesis outline 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes insider attacks and 
mitigation of such attacks. Chapter 3 describes the inherent vulnerabilities in SCADA 
systems. Chapter 4 presents the analysis in the vulnerabilities of the devices, and 
compares it with the specifications of the manufacturer. Chapter 5 discusses on our 
analysis and research. Chapter 6 provides the monitoring aspect of power control devices 
and general ways of safeguarding the SCADA systems. Chapter 7 discusses on the 
compliance of the devices with the NERC-CIP standards for providing cyber security in 
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the infrastructure. This includes the risks, technical aspects of the attacks and their 
consequences.  
And finally, chapter 8 presents a proposal for a SCADA test-bed for future 







 SCADA security has become an important area of interest amongst researchers 
since the attack from Stuxnet, and it has led many researchers to publish interesting 
research papers and voice their claims in the need to improve the existing security 
standards in the area of power systems. There have been several research papers in the 
area of Cyber Security in SCADA networks, and their main contributions are presented in 
the paragraphs below.  
 
A vulnerability assessment of cyber security for SCADA systems is presented by Ten et 
al in [2]. The paper provides the background information relating to SCADA attacks and 
explains the possible scenarios in which a system can be attacked, but does not provide 
information on the mitigation of the attacks. [4] provides information on the Data 
Integrity attacks and their impacts on SCADA control system, and gives a detailed 
analysis on the attack simulation and parameters that needs to be considered. But [5] 
suggests the use of  a SCADA Security Test bed in order to test the security in all 
systems, and provides information on on-going research considering Denial of Service 
attacks and Man-in-the-Middle attacks. [6] presents information on Protocol attacks, 
Routing attacks, Intrusions, Worm/Malware attacks, and Denial of Service attacks on 




                                       
 
 
     Figure 3: Smart Grid Infrastructure. 
 
The Smart Grid Infrastructure is presented in Figure 3, which represents the topology of 
our current-day implementation, without the cyber security model. The Smart Grid 
Infrastructure with the cyber security model, will comprise ‘network monitoring tools’ 
which will check all the packets that are being sent in and out of the network and 
characterize them to see if they are legitimate or not.  The block for monitoring networks 
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will be added as the last block of this model in order to reduce complexity and cost, and it 
will have to be written with a specific set of rules that apply to only power system 
devices. 
 
A security model for the Cyber Security infrastructure is presented in [7] and the authors 
discuss on three types of vulnerabilities - system vulnerability, scenario vulnerability, and 
access point vulnerability. A case study on the electric substation and the possible 
consequences at the power station, and substation is presented in [11]. The paper 
provides a summary on the consequences of the attacks on the power grid, but does not 
provide details on the exact nature of attacks.  Further, a case study corresponding to IEC 
61508 standard is presented in  [12], which provides top-priority technical 
recommendations to secure SCADA networks. 
 
Risk analysis and recommended practices are discussed in [13] in order to improve the 
accessing capabilities of the existing networks, and comparing them to the “best 
practices”. The authors recommend the cyber security assessment to be adjunct to other 
corporate security efforts rather than a standalone report. The authors from [14] compute 
the execution time of a specific code and compare it with the execution time during a 
legitimate operation, and look for an anomaly in their execution time to detect system 
compromise. They argue that execution times above, or below the respective bounds 
provide indications for a system compromise. Although this anomaly detection seems to 
work well in a controlled environment, there will be an increase in the number of false 




A complete list of past-attacks is specified in [15]. The author also describes the need for 
cyber-security in SCADA and the easiness of cracking the devices. This has been 
depicted in Figure 4. 
 
                                                         
 
         Figure 4: Diagram depicting the difficulty of an attack on SCADA systems 
 
Information on the Security incidents and trends in SCADA and process industries is 
presented in [16]. The authors focus on the Industrial Security Incident Database (ISID) 
for highlighting the need for a control system security management system that is holistic 
and well designed, rather than a piecemeal approach to security. 
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An analytical framework for vulnerability assessment of SCADA systems is provided in 
[17]. The paper emphasizes the research on three substation–level models for a high level 
of cyber security and points to the need for a SCADA test bed. Programming of the 
SCADA systems requires the attacker to have knowledge on the internal working of the 
device. A comprehensive idea on the programming of the SCADA systems is provided 
by Carlo and Julian in [18]. The paper discusses on the idea of corrupting the memory of 
the devices at the programming level, and presents the memory access possibilities of the 
MODBUS protocol.  
 
Ojeong-Dong et al provide an improvement in SCADA control system security with a 
software vulnerability analysis [19].  The authors provide an analysis on the software 
vulnerabilities and security concerns based on the their prototype for a SCADA security 
test bed and embed a script in the devices to change the state of the devices. This 
provides some information on the vulnerability, but the authors focus only on three types 
of attacks (sniffing, replay and spoofing). But they were not able to provide adequate 
results for their claims. Current efforts to secure SCADA networks and the technical 
aspects of launching a cyber attack is discussed by Rose Tsang in [20], and strategies for 
SCADA security, compliance and liability is further discussed in an article by Clint 







3.1 Past Attacks 
 In the past, insider attacks have been one of the major causes for concern for 
compromising control systems devices. In the event in Iran, Stuxnet infected project files 
belonging to Siemens WinCC/PCS7 SCADA control software and subverts a key 
communication library of WinCC called s7otbxdx.dll. Stuxnet also carried a zero-day 
exploit in the WinCC/SCADA database software in the form of a hard-coded database 
password [8]. The attacks seem designed to force a change in the centrifuge’s rotor speed, 
which could have possibly destroyed the centrifuge, and the consequences would have 
been catastrophic. The worm is reported to have been plugged-in through an USB drive 
in order to infect the system. These events indicate the necessity to secure the control 
system from insider attacks and there are several ways this can be done.  
 
1. Securing the computer from unwanted access through external drives. 
2. Securing the Ethernet socket, which might allow access by a potential hacker. 
3. Offering confidentiality (encryption) and integrity in the data sent between the 
computer and the Control System. 
3.2 Authentication and Encryption 
It is necessary to secure the data being transmitted between the Control System 
and the computer connected to it. In our work, we found in the power control devices that 
 
 13 
encryption can be manually setup with PLA programmable logic, with AES 128bit 
encryption setup between them. There is also an option in some of the devices to setup up 
an encryption scheme through software provided by the manufacturer for encrypting the 
transmitted data. Figure 5 shows the options in G60, a generator protection device 
manufactured by GE. This can be setup as soon as the device is installed into the Smart 
Grid.  
 
                          
                      Figure 5: Encryption in G60 with the software, Enervista 
 
 
The important requirements for the Smart Grid are listed below. 
a) Operation of the power system must continue 24×7 with high availability  
b) Power system operations must be able to continue during any security attack or 
compromise 
c) Power system operations must recover quickly after a security attack or the 
compromise of an information system. 










The SCADA system is an industrial control system for monitoring and controlling a 
device or a process. The heart of the SCADA system lies in the communication protocols 
used for sending and receiving data.  
4.1 Components of a SCADA system 
A SCADA system has the following subsystems: 
1) A Human-Computer Interface, that presents the data from the process to the 
display, and the human is able to monitor and control the process. 
2) A computer (supervisor), which is responsible for the communication between the 
human and the process. 
3) Remote Terminal Units (RTU) responsible for connecting to the sensors in the 
process, and converting the sensor signals to the digital data and sending it to the 
computer. 
4) Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). 
5) Communication between the RTU and the computer. 
 
The SCADA system monitors the entire power control system in real time. The data 
acquisition is handled locally at each site by sensors and electromechanical devices that 
are hard-wired to the RTU. Not only is data processed by the local RTU, but data is also 
compiled and formatted so that a control room operator using an HMI can monitor or 
adjust settings. Data is usually recorded and logged for analysis. 
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4.1 Common Vulnerabilities 
It can be observed that there are three inherent problems in SCADA system. 
a) SCADA networks are not authenticated. 
b) SCADA networks are never patched. It takes quite a few years for the 
manufacturer to upgrade the operating system. 
c) SCADA networks are provided uncontrolled interconnects. 
A common list of vulnerabilities in Smart Grid systems is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Common vulnerabilities in the SCADA systems in their specific category 
 
Category Common Vulnerability 




Poor authentication, Clear-text 
authentication, no password, weak 
password, Unauthenticated access to 
Web server,  
Network Protocol Implementations 
(Modbus) 
Buffer Overflow is possible, Lack of 
bounds checking in the service, Weak 
Authentication, No encryption 
 Poor Patch Management Unpatched operating systems 
Least User Privileges Violation Unauthorized directory traversal allowed, 
Services running with unnecessary 
privileges 
 Information Disclosure Unencrypted communication, 
unencrypted services, weak protection of 
user credentials, Man-in-the-middle 
attack 
Network Design Vulnerabilities Lack of network segmentation, No 
proper firewall for the Network Protocol 
implementation 
Network Component Configuration 
Vulnerabilities 
Access to specific ports on hosts not 
restricted to required IP address, Port 




4.3 Communication Protocols. 
SCADA protocols are designed to be very compact and they are designed to send 
information only when the master station polls the RTU. Typical legacy SCADA 
protocols include Modbus RTU, RP-570, Profibus and Conitel. These communication 
protocols are all SCADA-vendor specific but are widely adopted and used. Standard 
protocols are IEC 60870-5-101 or 104, IEC 61850 and DNP3. These communication 
protocols are standardized and recognized by all major SCADA vendors and many of 
these protocols now contain extensions to operate over TCP/IP. 
 
The Modbus protocol is implemented in encoded protocol data units (PDU), used in the 
SCADA system for communication. In another study, Bayindir et al.[22] present a 
Modbus aware firewall based on Linux Netfilter into the energy monitoring system, in 
order to prevent unauthorized access and certain Modbus function code. 
 
Currently, the Modbus protocol used in the communication does not have a solution to its 
current problems over Ethernet links. Despite the inherent lack of security in the design 
of Modbus, no security tools exist that are geared toward the detection of malicious 
Modbus traffic. Despite efforts to improve and provide guidance to help ensure security,  








4.4 Security Issues 
By conducting security assessments on a variety of Personal Communications 
Service (PCS) systems, IBM Internet Security Systems (ISS) consultants have identified 
some basic security issues impacting these devices [21]. The following provides a high 
level overview of the critical security issues surrounding the SCADA systems: 
 
• Weak protocols leave systems vulnerable. The underlying field bus protocols 
were never designed for security. Testing shows that these devices are very prone to 
simple denial of service attacks and buffer overflows. Additionally, since field bus 
protocols do not have built-in authentication, the devices will accept connections from 
anyone, and legitimate packets will be processed without any additional user or system 
authentication. 
 
• SCADA systems are not patched, or cannot be patched, as it will violate the 
vendor’s service contract. The operating system of the device is upgraded only during the 
next phase of manufacturing. 
 
• SCADA networks lack overall segmentation, and it is hard to configure the 
firewall distribution for the network, as the network can be easily breached in many 
places. 
 
• SCADA systems lack antivirus protection. Many system vendors will not support 
antivirus applications, and it will be hard to update the anti-virus database without being 
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connected via Internet. 
 
• Most SCADA systems communicate through the network and rely on 
unencrypted communications. This can cause eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks, 
and session hijacking. 
 
• SCADA systems do not have a database to store a log-file for security audits. 
 
• Lack of physical security may lead to insider attacks. 
 
These are only a few of the potential risks associated with SCADA and Process Control 
Systems. IBM ISS recommends that organizations look for these weaknesses in any 
assessment of SCADA vulnerabilities and/or an organization's broader security posture. 
But it is possible to handle these issues with virtual, ad-hoc patching, which was first 







 From our research by placing all the devices in a network we were able to find 
that the control system devices had several issues, which are listed below. 
 
1. The operating systems are in the default configuration. 
2. All devices are unpatched. 
3. An external device can be connected without any authentication. 
4. Services such as Telnet, and other unknown services run unencrypted sessions. 
5. Password policies could be ‘set’ by the devices for confidentiality, but they can be   
shared with other devices without authentication. 
 
Metasploit released a list of vulnerabilities on the VxWorks in 2010 regarding the 
VxWorks Debug Agent - WDB Agent [28]. The WDB agent is a system-level debugger 
for the VxWorks operating system that runs on UDP port 17185. This service is modeled 
on the SunRPC protocol and this allows anyone with access to this port to read memory, 
write memory, call functions, and manage tasks. Since the protocol is UDP and there is 
no authentication, handshake, or session ID, requests to the WDB agent can also be 




Our test on the vulnerabilities on some GE devices such as G60 and N60 shows that they 
run the VxWorks Debug Agent on the port 17185, and it is vulnerable for exploits. With 
the use of an Embedded WindSH (or) Tornado Shell for VxWorks, it will allow us to 
connect the device and directly exploit it. A custom Nmap script was able to point out 
several key details about the service running on port UDP 17185. 
 
Starting Nmap 5.51 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2011-04-24 21:53 Eastern Daylight Time 
Nmap scan report for 192.168.0.55 
Host is up (0.0010s latency). 
PORT      STATE SERVICE 
17185/udp open  wdb 
| wdb-version2:  
|   VULNERABLE: Wind River Systems VxWorks debug service enabled. See 
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/362332 
|   Agent version: 1.0.1\x00 
|   Agent MTU: 1500 
|   VxWorks version: 5.3.1\x00 
|   CPU Type: 97 
|   Board Support Package: GE Multilin - Main CPU\x00 
|   Boot line: marondev1edcge:\bootrom\bootrom.vxworks\x00 
|   Memory Size: 33554432 




MAC Address: 00:A0:F4:00:38:86 (GE) 
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 4.00 seconds  
 
 
Although the manufacturers of the GE devices do not disclose information on the 
microprocessors used, knowledge on the architecture of the microprocessor would make 
it possible to know the exact memory map of the device and reprogram it remotely. We 
were not able to ascertain what microprocessor was used. 
 
5.2 Other means of exploit 
Digital Fault Recorder (DFR) is an intelligent electronic device (IED) that records 
information about power system disturbances. It stores data in the digital format when 
certain conditions are triggered by the power systems, and the data captured is in the form 
of Harmonics, frequency, and voltage. In the power grid the DFR plays an important role 
with regards to analyzing the power grid and recording faults. But they run a vulnerable 
version of windows (Windows 2000 or Windows XP SP0) as their operating system, and 
they are connected to the power grid network. They can be easily compromised by 
attackers and can be used as a considerable source for launching exploits and launching 
denial of service attacks (DOS). In our power testing equipment, our analysis on the APP 
DFRs shows high-level vulnerabilities with regards to the SNMP server running with 
“public” community name. This can be exploited by an attacker with the snmpwalk.exe, 
and this can provide all netstat information and information on all the processes running 
in the devices with their process id number. This information can provide information 
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and access to all the PMUs that are connected along with the DFR, and the attacker 
would be successful with his reconnaissance and would be able to launch a denial of 
service. The details on such a denial of service with regards to the SNMP vulnerability is 
provided in [30]. 
 
5.3 Observed Vulnerabilities 
A vulnerability assessment was performed over the SCADA network comprising 
of devices from Manufacturers – Rugged Com, Siemens PMU, GE, SEL, and APP 
Arbiter. The devices were connected in a network with IP address assigned to each of the 
device and a computer running WindowsXP as it’s operating system was connected to it 
for transmitting and receiving messages from the devices. The network and connections 
were setup to simulate a power-grid environment where a large number of devices are 
connected to a single computer, which can be used to configure the devices and monitor 
the readings from the devices with the software provided by each manufacturer.  
 
The network was scanned for known vulnerabilities and certain exploits were conducted 
on the device, and goal was to simulate the real-world environment where an attacker 
would typically conduct a network scan and perform a reconnaissance in order to learn 
about the type of devices, the operating system, and the open ports communicating in the 
network.  The commonly used vulnerability and pen-testing tools such as Nessus, Nmap, 
Metasploit and Backtrack framework were used to learn about two key features:  




b) The behavior and response of the devices when networks scan is conducted.  
 
The results of the scan are presented in the table below.  High quality images could not be 
added in this document, and they have been present in [32] and [33].   
 




Table 2 provides the list of vulnerabilities from known exploits with pen-testing devices, 
and the devices are marked as ‘high’ or ‘low’ in terms of the risk of getting exploited.  
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All devices had unauthenticated and unencrypted access running telnet/ftp/http and an 
attacker can see through the contents of the packet by using a packet sniffer with little 
difficulty. Some devices had highly vulnerable services in them that could be exploited 
with by running Metasploit or Backtrack.  
It can be seen that the GE devices, in specific, G60 and N60 were running a vulnerable 
version of the VxWorks operating system, runs VxWorks WDB service that can be easily 
exploited with a Tornado Shell. Metasploit released the exact detail of this vulnerability 
earlier and an exploit on this enables us to perform a memory dump on the device, read 
memory, and write memory.  
An attacker can perform the following attacks with requiring any authentication:  
a) Remote memory dump.  
b) Remote memory patch. 
c) Remote calls to functions. 
d) Remote task management.  
The VxWorks vulnerability allows the attacker reprogram the device and modify the boot 
flag in the devices. For example, if the boot flag is set to 0x08, this would perform a 
quick auto-boot on the device, and if the boot flag is set to 0x20, this would disable login 
security.  This has been described in detail in [31] with a list of boot flag commands for 
specific operation. An attacker could write a script to set the boot flag to any value that 
would be advantageous to him.  
 
A vulnerability assessment was also performed on the main computer controlling the 
power system devices. The computer was running Windows XP, and this was chosen so 
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as to simulate the scenario in actual power grids as the main computers generally run 
either Windows 2000 or Windows XP. The smart grid community does not prefer to 
update the operating system and this is mainly because of the software compatibility 
issues with regards to the software that is provided by the device manufacturers along 
with the devices.  The computer is highly vulnerable to existing exploits and an attacker 
would be able to root the device and learn about all the devices connected to it 
(reconnaissance) or exploit it to send a payload to the devices in its network to re-





















 Power system monitoring, control and protection devices are thought to be in a 
separate network, but they have too many uncontrolled interconnects that provides the 
attackers numerous ways to get into the network. It is highly necessary that the cyber 
network be monitored in order to characterize the legitimate traffic from the illegitimate 
or malicious traffic. 
 
The power monitoring, control and protection devices have a smaller set of connection 
requests and replies compared to the conventional networks. And so, it will be much 
easier to design a set of rules for providing the firewall or an intrusion detection system 
for detecting intrusions in the system. 
 
6.1 Monitoring the control system environment 
Monitoring of the devices can be done in two ways - by monitoring the network 
by analyzing the network traffic with the list of devices connected to the network, and by 
using state estimation approach to monitor the state of the system.  
 
6.1.1 Monitoring the network 
6.1.1.1 Active monitoring 
Devices can be actively monitored by analyzing the network traffic that is flowing 
and looking for certain packets that are allowed in the set of rules. Any traffic that is 
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detected as abnormal will be dropped and will be reported for analysis. This approach 
requires us to develop specific protocol aware firewalls. Since many protocols are 
presently in use, one needs to target specific protocols that are mostly used. In this 
respect, DNP3, C37.118 and IEC 61850 should be targeted. In this research, Python is 
used as a programming tool with PyModbus library, which implements Modbus client 
and server communications. The usefulness of the libraries is provided in Appendix A. 
 
6.1.1.2 Passive monitoring 
Devices can be passively monitored by recording the traffic each day and then 
parsing the contents of the. pcap file (packet capture file). This would provide all the 
necessary information on traffic and then report all connections that were made and 
characterizing the legitimate traffic from illegitimate traffic. 
 
6.1.2 State Estimation 
State estimation is used in system monitoring to best estimate the power grid state 
through the analysis of meter measurement data and power system models. It is the 
process of eliminating unknown state variables on a power grid based on the 
measurement data. Hence by using the output of state estimation, one can determine 
whether a suspected batch of data is legitimate or could have been altered. 
 
An attacker can determine the power system configuration and generate bad 
measurements in a way such that the bad measurements are not detected (False Data 
Injection Attacks).  The attacker can also utilize small errors in measurements in State 
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Estimation algorithms and use that for increasing the chances of not being detected. Since 
an attacker will not have access (or it will be very difficult) to the real time model of the 
system, then the state estimation results will be an independent yardstick to determine 
authenticity of data. The theory of such attacks is explained by Yao Liu and Peng Ning in 
[29]. 
 
6.2 Monitoring model 
The model for monitoring the network comprising of the networking monitoring 
tool and state estimation model is presented in Figure 6.  
Figure 6. Model for monitoring the power grid network.
 
30 
The data from the power grid is fed into the “Analysis” block for monitoring the network 
packets and analyzing the state of the network at that particular time. It consists of two 
blocks - the block for network-traffic analysis, and the block for Chi-Square analysis. The 
packet analysis consists of monitoring the network for malicious traffic and 
characterizing them from legitimate traffic. The characterization is done based on a 
specific set of rules for the protocol specific to the device which is being monitored, and 
the protocol used such as DNP3, C37.118 and IEC 61850.  
 
The rules for characterizing the network traffic has several layers of security configured 
in it, and has simple rules that considers “good” traffic if it originates from the IP 
addresses which are allowed to communicate and establish SYN packets to the other 
devices. If the originating IP address is not present in the list of allowed devices, it is 
reported. The packets are further inspected for headers related to the protocol specific to 
the devices, and inspecting the commands that are sent and received such as ‘Brick’, 
etc.… The network monitoring script also scans for abnormal port scans and ping sweeps 
which is the first step for hacker to detect the devices in the network. Any abnormal port 
scans, ping sweeps, and ICMP requests are recorded and reported for further analysis on 
determining the location of the device conducting reconnaissance on the SCADA 
network. Besides the network monitoring side, state estimation is done to characterize 








State estimation is the process of eliminating unknown state variables on a power grid 
based on the measurement data, and one can determine whether a suspected batch of data 
is legitimate or could have been altered. The state estimation is done by considering a set 
of variables consisting of all bus voltage magnitudes and angles except the phase angle at 
an arbitrarily selected bus, which is zero.  The data from the power grid is sampled and 
the state of the system is estimated based on the current state of the system, and this 
process is done in the Chi-Square Analysis block. The data is immediately compared with 
the legitimate set of data originating from the system model, which is characterized as 
“good” data. An attacker can determine the power system configuration and generate bad 
measurements (False Data Injection Attacks), the Chi-Square Analysis block will be able 
to compare it with the system model, and any inconsistencies obtained as a results of the 
comparison is noted and reported.  The overall state of the network is characterized as a 
function of the state estimation results together with the results from monitoring the 
network. We believe that such a level of characterization will be of high standard and 
extremely accurate with regards to reporting malicious data and monitoring the network 










COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS 
 
 Power system devices have a huge number of uncontrolled interconnects but are 
thought to be totally isolated. We had already visited a lot of events in which the smart 
grid systems were either accidentally or intentionally susceptible to attacks over the 
network. It is highly important that all the manufacturers are compliant with a set of 
standards that describe the security measures that ought to be met in the devices before 
they are installed as power grid equipments. NERC and NISTIR 7628 set some of the 
important standards, which provide detailed information on the requirements of power 
grid infrastructure. Our goal in this thesis is to highlight the requirements, and set the 
objectives of this research to be in par with the critical standards.    
 
7.1 Current Standards and Guidelines 
NERC and NISTIS7628 provide the critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
requirements that ought to be followed while installing a power grid. This has been 
discussed in detail in [34]. Some of the key requirements are as follows: 
a) Standards identification and selection – This is the first step, and it involves 
identification of the standards and guidelines that will match the setup for the 
infrastructure.  
b) Policies and procedure analysis – After the first step, the policies and the 
procedures must be added along with the existing guidelines to make sure that 
they are compliant with the requirements.  
 
 33 
c) Critical asset identification and classification – By following the standards, the 
critical assets have to be identified and classified based on risk management.  
d) Security vulnerability assessment – It is required that a security vulnerability 
assessment is performed in order to understand the exact vulnerabilities in the 
devices. 
e) Assessment validation – The results of the security vulnerability assessment have 
to be validated by a combination of analysis, penetration testing and interviews. It 
is also important to analyze false negatives and false positives, which could be 
critical for analysis and validation.  
Besides all the above recommendations, it is important to draft mitigation, validation, 
legal, management and training requirements in order to be compliant with the standards.  
 
7.2 Our goals 
 Our goal in this research is to work towards using and developing tools and 
creating an auditing environment in order to aid devices that operate in the SCADA 
network to be compliant with the standards set by NERC and NISTIR7628. In the 
previous chapters, the work done pertaining to this research was clearly explained with 
the need to the work on power control devices. It is necessary to detect all possibilities of 
attack and characterize them in terms of the risk involved in the existing configuration of 
the devices. This would enable identification of the critical assets and providing a 





This thesis also provides information on the monitoring aspect of power control devices 
and providing means of identifying threats that would be critical to the infrastructure.  
Although the work done in this is still in its infancy, it would be highly necessary that the 
community works towards improvement in the existing monitoring models, and provide 
control system devices with a high-level intrusion detection system, and enable them to 














 SCADA security is an emerging topic in the area of information security, 
and the work done is still in its infancy. The goal of this thesis is to expose some of the 
common vulnerabilities in the control system environment and monitor the network to 
prevent any exploits. From the past attacks, it is clear that it does not take too much effort 
for an attacker to compromise power control devices, and Stuxnet is probably the most 
advanced among all the previous exploits. The goal of this research is to work towards 
using and developing tools to create a SCADA test-bed in order to test various devices 
and explore the possibilities of securing the control system environment. The network 
monitoring solution provided in this thesis is still in its infancy, as it needs to be 
constantly changed and improved in order to accommodate the rules for different 
protocol standards used by different devices. The model also needs to be tested with all 
the devices in order to develop an ideal intrusion detection system that would work well 
in any environment. The work pertaining to this will be a future work and would greatly 
solve the need to develop a monitoring solution for each model. Further more, the idea of 
using State Estimation along with network analysis would help in offering a highly 
efficient monitoring model that could detect attacks in terms of both the control-system 
perspective, and the networking perspective. The development and testing of this 
complete model would be crucial to solving the requirement of an ideal intrusion 
detection system.  
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Chapter 5 presents the vulnerabilities that were observed in the devices, and they have 
been conducted to simulate the same environment an attacker would use to learn about 
the devices. With regards to the performing a memory dump on the VxWorks operating 
system, some knowledge on the specifications on the processor and the size of the 
memory would have helped in learning entirely about the possibilities of attack. But 
manufacturers do not reveal this information in order to safe guard their product. As a 
future work, the goal of this thesis is to perform a preliminary set of tests in order to 
develop a complete SCADA test-bed with an ideal monitoring model, and it will be 
necessary to partner with the manufacturers to learn complete details on the product in 







 Security research in the control system environment is still an on-going research 
topic when compared to the development in other areas of information security. The 
presence of security threats and exploitable weaknesses in the control system devices 
makes it easier for attackers to target them, and this could be potentially catastrophic for 
national security and nuclear or military sites if the control system devices get 
compromised. The thesis addresses four scenarios in which an attack can be performed 
on the devices – insider attacks, attack on the computer accessing the SCADA system, 
attack on the SCADA network, and direct exploit on the device by reprogramming it.  A 
network-monitoring model has been proposed with state estimation theory, and network 
analysis to identify and report any malicious attacks on the SCADA network. However, 
this work is still in its infancy, and it is necessary to develop and maintain tools to offer 
an ideal solution to the SCADA environment, and that would be the future work of this 
thesis. The thesis has also addressed the importance of NERC and NISTIR7628 
guidelines and the need for the smart grid to be compliant with those standards. The 
ultimate goal of this research would be to develop a highly robust SCADA test-bed, and 






NETWORK MONITORING SCRIPT FOR CONTROL SYSTEM 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
 The network monitoring script for the control system environment is written in 
Python, a popular programming language used by programmers and developers in the 
software industry. We will be discussing only a few specific libraries that aid the 
development of network monitoring script and the effectives of those libraries written in 
Python for specific protocols that control system devices use. These libraries are given as 
follows:  
a) Pcapy (used along with IMPacket) 
b) Scapy 
c) Pymodbus 
Pcapy is a Python extension module that interfaces with the packet capture library 
(libpcap) and it enables python to capture packets on the network. This would allow us to 
capture the network traffic of the SCADA network and perform a passive analysis on the 
network by parsing the captured data and learn a lot about even the tiniest events 
happening in the network.  It is normally used along with IMPacket , which is a 
collection of Python classes focused on providing access to network packets. Packets can 
be constructed from scratch and parsed from raw data.  
 
Scapy, is a powerful packet manipulation tool which can be used with Python scripts to 
forge or decode packets of a wide number of protocols and send them on wire, capture 
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them, match requests and replies, and much more.  Scapy can be used to perform an 
active monitoring on the SCADA system and monitor all the fields of the packet such as 
the source, destination, and the payload. This helps us in characterizing the nature of the 
packet based on the source and frame a set of rules for the SCADA network such that 
only the authorized devices are allowed to communicate and other connections can be 
reported for unauthorized access.  
 
Pymodbus is a full Modbus protocol implementation for asynchronous communications. 
It has both client and server features in order to fully simulate the working of the Modbus 
protocol, enabling the client to fully read/write protocol with asynchronous and 
synchronous payload builders. The server can be function as a Modbus server operating 
on port 502. Writing a monitoring script for thousands of devices does not seem like the 
most efficient way of testing, and using the Pymodbus allows us to test as many devices 
as the base operating system allows by exhausting the virtual IP addresses. The complete 
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